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Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, national security law
has exploded as a field of study.' The past decade has seen exponential
growth in scholarship, course offerings, conferences, and programs focused
on U.S. national security policies. 2 At the same time, hot-button issues
such as the detention, treatment, and trial of terrorism suspects have
attracted the attention of scholars from across the domestic and
international spectrum. Much of the literature in this area focuses on the
"exceptional" nature of the policies implemented after 9/11, explaining why
and how those policies represent a significant, if not radical, break from
past behavior and norms.

*
Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. This article is based on
my remarks at the 2011 LatCrit South-North Exchange, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (May 13,
2011).

1.
Michael R. Gordon, A DAY OF TERROR: AN ASSESSMENT; When an Open Society
Is Wielded as a Weapon Against Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/day-terror-assessment-when-open-society-wielded-weaponagainst-itself.html?ref-septl 12001 (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
2.
See, e.g., Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, TerrorizingAcademia, 60 J. LEGAL. ED. 433,
440-41 (2011) (discussing the trend).
3.
See id. at 440 ("A review of the post-9/11 legal literature reveals a scholarship obsessed
with the exceptional."); Judith Resnik, Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110
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Some, however, have questioned the separateness of national security
law as a discipline. Aziz Huq, for example, argues against "national
security exceptionalism," explaining instead that judicial responses to
national security emergencies more closely resemble transubstantive trends
in public law and judicial responses to non-security emergencies. In a
similar vein, Judith Resnik has stressed the continuities between the post9/11 "war on terrorism" jurisprudence and the United States' treatment of
criminal defendants, convicted prisoners, and immigrants5 while James
Forman has emphasized the parallels between the treatment of "enemy
combatants" at GuantAnamo6 and that of indigent defendants in the United
States.!
Scholars also have discussed how the increased emphasis on national
security has impacted immigration law and policy since 9/11. Jennifer
Chacon, for example, describes how national security rhetoric has distorted
the debate around immigration and crime control.8 Kevin R. Johnson and
Bernard Trujillo have explained how national security concerns have come
to dominate discussion over comprehensive immigration reform.9 As these
scholars argue, a myopic focus on terrorism has not merely led to
increasingly draconian deportation and detention measures, it has also
created a gap between the rhetoric of security and the reality of diminished
protections for immigrants without any security gains.'o
This Article pursues similar themes but from a different perspective.
The Article examines how concepts that originally developed in the
immigration law context have resurfaced in post-9/11 national security
jurisprudence and helped shape the United States' approach to the detention
and treatment of terrorism suspects. At first blush, the constellation of postCOLUM. L. REv. 579, 595-96 (2010) (describing expansion of the coverage of "war on terrorism" cases
in a leading federal courts casebook).
4.
(2009).
5.

Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 227
Resnik, supranote 3, at 577-78.

See generally James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped
6.
Make the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 331 (2009). For a similar
perspective, based on her years of representing capital defendants in Louisiana, see Denny LeBoeuf,
From the Big Easy to the Big Lie, in THE GUANTANAMO LAWYERS:

INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE

LAW (Mark Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz eds., 2010).
7.

Id.

8.
Jennifer M. Chacon, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1830 (2007).
Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security after
9.
September 11, and the Future ofNorth American Immigration,91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1373 (2007).
10.

See generally Chacon, supra note 8. See also Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 9.
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9/11 national security issues may appear distinct from immigration law.
Trials by military commission, the imprisonment of enemy combatants, and
the targeted killing of terrorism suspects, for example, may appear distinct
from the detention and removal of noncitizens under immigration law. The
former are subject to military, not civilian, jurisdiction and decisionmaking. Additionally, they implicate the executive's wartime powers and
are justified under law-of-war principles, among other differences.
Yet, as this Article explains, important similarities exist. These
linkages illustrate how concepts of rights and membership in the polity
inform the United States' response to the treatment of terrorism suspects.
They also provide a window into some larger forces shaping America's
response to national security concerns.
Part I will describe several areas of overlap between immigration and
national security law. These include the use of narratives that pit the rights
of others (whether defined as immigrants or terrorism suspects) against the
public safety; the development of two-tiered adjudicatory systems
legitimized by the government's classification of the nature of the libertydeprivation; restrictions on access to the courts and limitations on judicial
review; and the use of security as a proxy for other agendas. Part II
examines how President Obama's failed attempt to close Guantanamo
highlights how U.S. immigration policy and jurisprudence continues to
inform and shape the United States' approach to the detention and trial of
terrorism suspects.
I. THE IMMIGRATION LAW INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

After 9/11, U.S. counter-terrorism policy moved in a new direction,
away from a law enforcement paradigm and towards a military, law-of-warbased model." Central to this approach were the detention of terrorism
suspects as "enemy combatants," the use of military commissions to
prosecute terrorist crimes, and, at least initially, the use of harsh
interrogation methods that bordered on, and in some instances amounted to,
torture.12 In implementing these policies at Guantanamo and other offshore prisons, the United States sought to avoid any legal protections under
domestic or international law and to deny prisoners access to the courts. 3
Although these policies marked a significant break with the past-part of
11.
See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, Principlesof Counter-TerrorismLaw, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
771, 772 (2011) (highlighting the paradigm shift in her review of the book by Jimmy Gurul6 and
Geoffrey S. Corn of the same title).
12.

For an overview of these developments, see JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER

9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S NEW GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM (2011).

13.

Id.
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what the Bush administration termed a "new kind of war"-they bear
important similarities to the United States' approach to immigration and the
treatment of noncitizens generally.14
A. Framingthe Debate: TradingRights for Security
Immigration law rests principally on a dichotomy between citizens and
noncitizens, as it regulates the right of noncitizens to enter and remain in
the United States.' 5 Immigration law, however, has long served as a vehicle
for expressions of broader xenophobic sentiments that transcend questions
of border regulation. During the late nineteenth century, for example, racist
attitudes towards the Chinese helped spark passage of the Chinese
Exclusion Act and laid the groundwork for other racially motivated laws
that followed.16 The Supreme Court tied the government's efforts to stem
the "vast hordes of Chinese citizens" seeking entry into the United States to
the government's power to ensure the country's security and stability."
Following the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920, foreigners were portrayed as
dangerous to the public safety to justify harsh immigration restrictions and
removal policies.'8 The trend continued throughout the Cold War, and was
manifested by, for example, the exclusion of noncitizens based on political
viewpoints deemed inimical to the country's security.' 9 The conflation of
immigration control and national security has increased steadily since the
mid-1990s, especially with the post-9/l1 focus on combatting global
terrorism. 20
In immigration law, the debate is typically framed as a zero-sum
contest between security on the one hand, and the rights and welfare of
immigrants, on the other. The more concerns about global terrorism
permeate that debate, the sharper that line becomes. Fears about terrorism
raise the stakes, as public officials, lawmakers, and commentators create
and sustain a narrative in which the country's safety depends on restricting
the rights of noncitizens both inside and outside America's borders.
14.

See generally Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 9.

15.
See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law oflImmigration, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (1998).
16.

Id.

17.

Chacon, supra note 8, at 1833-34.

18.

DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENs: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN

THE WAR ON TERRORISM 85-153 (The New Press 2003).

19. See Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at--and
Beyond--Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1552-54 (2010) (discussing the ideological
exclusion provisions of the McCarren-Walter Act).
20.

Id. at 1834; Cole, supra note 18.
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A similar narrative has taken root in the post-9/1 1 national security
law context. "War on terrorism" measures such as the detention of "enemy
combatants," the use of military commissions, and reliance on harsh
interrogation methods to gather intelligence all rely on the assumption that
terrorism suspects-or at least noncitizen terrorism suspects-should not be
accorded the same protections as other individuals. On one level, these
measures may be viewed from a "state of exception" perspective: that
mortal threats to the polity create pressures to depart or seek exemptions
from ordinary norms. 2 1 Following 9/11, this theory justified exceptions to
established rules, practices, and due process protections embodied by the
adoption of military, law-of-war-based approach to counter-terrorism
policy. 22 Yet, various "war on terror" policies-especially those allowing
the government to detain terrorism suspects without a federal criminal
trial-have impacted noncitizens almost exclusively, even though citizens
can pose, and often have posed, an equivalent terrorist threat as
noncitizens. 23 Further, these policies are justified not as temporary or
shared sacrifices to meet an imminent danger, but as necessary and
potentially permanent limitations warranted by the inferior legal status of
noncitizens, who do not share the same rights as American citizens.24
In short, the framing used in prior efforts to restrict immigrants' rights
by pitting those rights against the country's security has continually
resurfaced in the construction of a post-9/1 1 national security narrative that
depends on curtailing noncitizens' rights. The most significant difference
between the immigration and "war on terrorism" narratives is ultimately
one of scope: whereas immigration law focuses on the United States,
counter-terrorism measures focus both domestically and externally,
providing basis to restrict non-citizens' rights not only in the United States
but also at overseas detention centers like Guantinamo.

21.
See Mark Danner, After September 11: Our State of Exception, NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BOOKS (Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/oct/13/afterseptember- 1-our-state-exception (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
22.
See Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1003 (2004) (discussing the temptation to view the
United States' response to 9/11 through a "state of exception" framework).
See id. at 1028, 1048 (noting, respectively, the U.S. citizenship of John Walker Lindh and
23.
Yaser Hamdi).
24.
See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? MilitaryDetention Through the Habeas
Lens, 52 B.C. L. REv. 769, 812 (2011) (discussing distinction drawn between rights of citizens and
noncitizens by the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina in Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F.
Supp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2005)).
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B. The Development of Two-Tiered Adjudicatory Structures

Another important way "war on terror" cases echo immigration law is
in their creation of alternative forms of adjudication that provide
significantly fewer legal protections than the criminal process when
depriving an individual of his or her liberty.2 5 More than a century ago, the
Supreme Court held that deportation was "not punishment for a crime" but
rather "a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who
has not complied with . . . conditions" for his continuing residence in the

United States. 26 Defining deportation as a civil, rather than a criminal,
offense helped justify denying immigrants facing removal from the country
the same constitutional protections afforded those facing conviction for a
crime, including the right to a jury trial and the prohibition on ex post facto
laws.27 The detention of noncitizens has been characterized as part of
deportation, which avoids triggering the full panoply of constitutional
protections, so long as the liberty-deprivation is tied to the immigration
removal process.28 This view of deportation as civil rather than criminal in
nature has persisted for more than a century, despite the Supreme Court's
acknowledgment that deportation's effects can be extremely harsh, akin to
banishment or exile. 29 Thus, while the Court has required that deportation
proceedings satisfy procedural due process, those proceedings are
significantly less robust than those afforded defendants facing criminal
prosecution. 3 0 Moreover, the characterization of immigration as civil-and
thus outside the protections of the criminal justice system-has helped
sustain the government's broad and largely unreviewable authority to
25. See Jesselyn A. Radack, You Say Defendant, I Say Combatant: Opportunistic Treatment
of Terrorism Suspects Held in the United States and the Needfor Due Process, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 525, 535 (2005) (describing conclusion of ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy
Combatants that "uncharged U.S. citizen detainees have fewer rights and protections than those who
have been charged with serious criminal offenses").
26.

Fong Yue Tong v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).

27.
See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
about Why HardLaws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1889, 1899-1906 (2000).
28.
See Whitney Chelgren, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why It Is Unconstitutional to
Detain Immigrants Without Procedural Protections, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1477, 1513-14 (2011)
(discussing how the power to detain does inhere in the power to remove or exclude).
29.
Padillav. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481-82 (2010); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530
(1952) (noting that deportation may "deprive a man of all that makes life worth living") (quoting Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Galvan, 347 U.S. at
530 (comparing deportation to banishment or exile).
30. The Court recognized this imbalance in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39
(1984) ("consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context
of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.")
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remove aliens from the country under the so-called plenary power
doctrine.
The military detention and trial of suspected terrorists after 9/11 has
followed a similar pattern, with the development of alternative adjudicatory
mechanisms designed to provide fewer protections than the criminal justice
system.32 The U.S. government has asserted the authority to detain
individuals indefinitely without charge based on their classification as
"enemy combatants." 3 The Supreme Court generally endorsed this
approach in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 4 holding that the detention of enemy
fighters to prevent their "return to the battlefield" is a fundamental and
Under this form of detention, the
accepted incident of waging war.
prisoner need not be tried but may be held indefinitely without charge.
He must however, at least if a U.S. citizen, receive due process. 37 But this
process can be provided in a properly constituted military tribunal and, even
if it takes the form of a federal court hearing, it must take into account the
government's national security concerns through, for example, lax
restrictions on hearsay and a lower burden of proof than in a criminal
proceeding.38 Although the Court in Hamdi cautioned against expanding
this paradigm beyond the parameters of a prisoner seized on the battlefield
(in Hamdi's case, in Afghanistan), the concept of a global "war on terror"and, by extension, detention authority that extends more broadly than
battlefield captures-has continued to gain acceptance among courts,
legislators, and the public.3 9
31.
See generally, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination
and the ConstitutionalLaw ofImmigration,46 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1998).
32.
See Jonathan Hafetz, Stretching Precedent Beyond Recognition: The Misplaced Reliance
on World War II Cases in the "War on Terror," 28 REv. LrIG. 365, 365 (2008).
Although the Obama dropped the label "enemy combatant," it has asserted similar (if more
33.
limited) authority to detain individuals indefinitely as "unprivileged enemy belligerents" if they are part
of or substantially supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. See In re GuantAnamo Bay
Detainee Litigation, Respondents Memorandum Regarding The Government's Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantinamo Bay, at 1, No. 08-442 (2009), available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/doj-detain-authority-3-13-09.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2012).
34.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).

35.

Id.

36.
See id. at 509 (holding that due process demands a detained citizen be given only a
"meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention").

Cong.

37.

Id.

38.

See id. at 538-39.

See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th
39.
§ 1021 (2011).

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

632

[Vol. 18:3

In theory, both citizens and noncitizens may be detained as "enemy
combatants."4 0 Hamdi, of course, was a U.S. citizen.4 In practice,
however, the "enemy combatant" detention power has been used almost
exclusively against noncitizens, while suspected citizen-terrorists have been
prosecuted, if at all, in federal court. 4 2 President Obama's top counterterrorism advisor has stated that the administration would not seek to detain
U.S. citizens outside the criminal justice system (Hamdinotwithstanding).43
For detainees facing prosecution in a military commission for war crimes,
the dichotomy between citizens and noncitizens has long been explicit:
President Bush's November 13, 2001 executive order establishing military
commissions," and the Military Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009 that
succeeded it, apply expressly to noncitizens only. 45 The commissions were
originally created to try terrorism suspects without the protections of the
criminal justice system.46 Although the current commissions now provide
more safeguards than prior incarnations, they still do not afford defendants
the same protections they would receive in a federal trial. 7
If a noncitizen is charged with a crime, even a terrorism offense, he is
entitled to the same Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as a citizen facing

40. See Norma C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 335,
338 (2005) (recognizing the potential for indefinite detention of citizens as "enemy combatants" as a
result ofthe paradigm shift to treating terrorism as military issue).
41.

Id. See also Padillav. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 386 (4th Cir. 2005).

42.
Only two American citizens have been detained as "enemy combatants" in the "war on
terror:" Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla. By contrast, several thousand non-citizens have been held as
"enemy combatants," excluding those detained in Iraq.
See Remarks by John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
43.
Counterterrorism, at Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law Symposium (Mar. 18, 2011),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/remarksby johnbrennan at-brennan_
center_symposium/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
44. In 2006, the Supreme Court invalidated the Bush's executive order, finding that the
military commissions he created lacked congressional authorization. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 568 (2006). The Court did not, however, reject the creation of new military commissions or
commission that again applied only to noncitizens, as the Military Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009
both do.
45. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006)
[hereinafter MCA of 2006]; Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190
(2009) [hereinafter MCA of 2009].
46. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
47. The commissions, for example, provide fewer safeguards against the use of hearsay
evidence. See HAFETZ, supra note 12, at 241-42.
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prosecution. 4 8 However, since noncitizens may also be detained outside the
criminal justice system, these protections are provided at the government's
discretion, depending on whether it elects to proceed under a law-of-war
framework, at least with respect to the category of cases that framework
covers. 4 9 In short, post-9/11 law-of-war detention and military commission
prosecutions serve a similar function as classification of deportation in the
immigration removal context: creating an alternative and less rightsprotective forum for adjudicating the rights of noncitizens facing severe
deprivations of liberty.
C. RestrictingAccess to the Courts and the Scope ofJudicialReview
Since the late nineteenth century, the political branches have
repeatedly tried to restrict federal court review over administrative
decisions to deport or exclude noncitizens from the United States.o
Although courts have generally maintained some form of judicial review,
particularly over deportation decisions, that review has focused on
preserving procedural rather than substantive rights.
Moreover, those
procedural protections, grounded in the Due Process Clause, have often
been limited in scope and intensity. 52 Both the civil nature of deportation
and the government's plenary power over immigration have justified
limitations on the rights of noncitizens facing removal from the United
States.
48. See, e.g., Wang Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 241 (1896). Fourth Amendment
protections, however, may vary between citizens and noncitizens, at least if the seizure occurs outside
the United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
49. See Ashley C. Pope, After Guantdnamo: Legal Rights of Foreign Detainees Held in the
United States in the "War on Terror", 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 504, 532 (2011) (detailing decreased
procedural rights under the law-of-war detention and prosecution framework).
50. See Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdictionand the Rule ofLaw After the 1996 Immigration Act,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1967 (2000) (noting repeated attempts by Congress to establish finality and
limit judicial review of immigration officials' decisions).
51.
See Kanstroom, supra note 27, at 1903; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of
Immigration Law: ProceduralSurrogatesFor Substantive ConstitutionalRights, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1625, 1628 (1992). See also Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to
Judicial Review ofImmigration Proceedings,29 CONN. L. REv. 1411, 1418 (1997).
52.
For example, in the first case where the Supreme Court held that non-citizens facing
deportation were entitled to due process, the Court also held that the deportation hearing in question
satisfied due process even though the non-citizen claimed that she received only informal notice of her
hearing and did not understand either the language of the proceeding or the nature of the charges against
her. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1903). See generally, Chacon, supra note 8, at
1868-69, n.23 1.
53.
See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and Alien
Removal, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961 (1998).
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Congressional measures during the last two decades focused on
"criminal aliens" follow this general pattern.S4 In 1996, for example, the
Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)55 and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)5 6 both
purported to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to review the removal of
noncitizens convicted of certain crimes. 57 At the same time, Congress
broadened significantly the category of noncitizens who could be removed,
including for relatively minor offenses or very old crimes, 58 while
eliminating a critical form of discretionary relief from deportation whereby
a judge was empowered to grant a waiver of deportation based on
individualized consideration of humanitarian concerns, such as the
noncitizen's length of time in the United States, family connections, and
community ties.5 9
In June 2001, the Supreme Court held that eliminating all judicial
review of deportation decisions, including habeas corpus review, would
raise serious constitutional problems under the Suspension Clause and
accordingly construed the 1996 acts not to eliminate habeas review.6 0 The
Court also concluded that the provision eliminating discretionary waivers of
deportation did not apply retroactively to noncitizens who had pled guilty to
a criminal offense and who would have been eligible for a discretionary

54.
See Vashti D. Van Wyke, Retroactivity and Immigrant Crimes Since St. Cyr: Emerging
Signs of JudicialRestraint, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2006) (noting the central purpose of AEDPA
and IIRIRA to facilitate deportation of convicted immigrants through restriction and then removal of
212(c) waiver mechanism).
55.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 28, 40, 42, 49 within the U.S.C.)
[hereinafter AEDPA].
56.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of3, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 40,
41, 42,43, 44,45, 46,47, 48 within the U.S.C.) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
57.
See Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation
of Judicial Review, 78 TEX L. REV. 1549, 1562 (2000) (identifying AEDPA and IIRIRA provisions
purporting to restrict judicial review of deportation orders in immigration cases).
58.
See Chacon, supra note 8, at 1844-45 (discussing expansion of "aggravated felony"
category and other changes).
59. IIRIRA eliminated waivers of deportation pursuant to former section 212(c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and replaced it with a much narrower form of relief known as
"cancellation of removal" under INA section 240A. See IIRIRA, supra note 56, § 304(b); 8 U.S.C. §
1129b(a)-(b). See also Chacon, supra note 8, at 1845-46 (discussing the changes brought by the 1996
immigration acts). During the five-year period prior to 1996, authority to grant discretionary waivers
had been exercised to prevent the deportation of more than 10,000 noncitizens. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct.
at 1480.
60.

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
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waiver of deportation at the time of their plea under the law then in effect.61
While Congress has continued to limit judicial review over removal
decisions through the REAL ID Act, some judicial review remains. 62 This
review, however, has done little to alter the increasingly harsh legal
consequences imposed on noncitizens due to the criminalization of
immigration violations, expansion of removable offenses, and restrictions
on discretionary relief.63 As before, judicial interventions have been
directed primarily at ensuring procedural protections rather than addressing
broader policies.64 Last term, for example, the Supreme Court held in
Padilla v. Kentucky that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to
advice given by criminal defense attorneys to noncitizens regarding the
immigration consequences from a criminal conviction.6 ' Although Padilla
may help mitigate the impact of laws that impose draconian immigration
consequences for often minor criminal convictions, it does not address
those laws themselves or the policies underlying them.66
Judicial decisions involving detainees in the "war on terror" have
followed a similar trajectory, with courts resisting efforts to eliminate
judicial review and providing some basic procedural safeguards, but failing
to challenge substantive policies limiting the rights of noncitizens in the
In January 2002, the United States started
name of national security.
The
bringing prisoners to its naval base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba.
61.

Id. at 326.

62. See Nancy Morawetz, Back to the Future: Lessons Learnedfrom Litigation over the 1996
Restrictions on JudicialReview, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113, 123-29 (2006-2007) (describing how the
REAL ID Act both streamlines and curtails judicial review of various issues in deportation cases);
Aaron G. Leiderman, Channeling the Constitution's Most Important Human Right: JudicialReview of
Mixed Questions under the Real ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1373-76 (2006) (describing how
the REAL ID Act threatens to restrict judicial review by channeling review in the court of appeals).
63.
See Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigation Law and the Perils ofHaste,58 UCLA L.
REv. 1705, 1734 (2011) (identifying the especially harsh immigration consequences of, among other
crimes, aggravated felonies and certain drug offenses).
64. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The CuriousEvolution oflmmigration Law: Procedural
Surrogatesfor Substantive ConstitutionalRights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625 (1992).
65.

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.

66. See McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to "Integral": The Seismic Evolution of
Padillav. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 How. L.J. 795, 807-09 (2011)
(discussing the potential impact of Padilla).
67. See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the 'War on Terror', 108 COLUM. L.
REv. 1013, 1029-32 (2008).
68. See A Nation Challenged: Guantdnamo Bay; In Cuba, Muted Acceptance Greets Presence
of Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/14/
world/nation-challenged-guantanamo-bay-cuba-muted-acceptance-greets-presenceprisoners.html?ref-guantanamobaynavalbasecuba (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
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government consistently resisted any effort by the prisoners there to seek
habeas corpus review of their detention. It argued that, as noncitizens
held outside the sovereign territory of the United States, Guantinamo
detainees had no right to judicial review of their confinement.7 0 Thus, from
the beginning, citizenship status, in conjunction with territorial location,
served as the basis for denying foreign nationals access to U.S. courts.7'
In each of its three Guantinamo "enemy combatant" decisions, the
Supreme Court has maintained federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over the
detentions.72 In Rasul v. Bush and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,74 its first two
Guantinamo detainee decisions, the Court upheld habeas jurisdiction on
statutory grounds.75 In Boumediene v. Bush, the third decision in the
trilogy, the Court ruled that Congress' effort to strip the courts of
jurisdiction violated the Constitution's Suspension Clause.76
Since
Boumediene was decided more than three years ago, district courts have
issued sixty habeas decisions in the Guantinamo detainee cases and the
D.C. Circuit has issued thirteen opinions, addressing an array of issues
concerning the legality of detaining noncitizens at Guantinamo.77
In general, the GuantAnamo detainee habeas litigation has yielded
some baseline procedural protections for detainees, including the right to a
hearing before a federal judge, the right to present evidence in their defense

69. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror:
An Essay on Law andPoliticalScience, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 352, 356 (2010) (explaining that it was not
until 2004, through the Rasul decision, that the Court recognized federal jurisdiction over Guantdnamo
detainees existed under the general habeas statute).
70. See JONATHAN HAFETz, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S NEW
GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM 118 (2011) (describing the government's argument in Rasul that "foreign
nationals held outside the sovereign territory of the United States had no right to habeas corpus or other
constitutional protections").
71.
Id. ("The Bush administration relied principally on Johnson v. Eisentrager,arguing that it
established a categorical rule barring the exercise of habeas corpus review over the detention of any
foreign national captured and held abroad.") (emphasis added).
72. See Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-Term
Executive Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REv. 961, 991-93 (2009).
73.

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).

74.

Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 843-44 (2008).

75. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481 (applying 28 U.S.C.
567 (applying 10 U.S.C. §821 (2006)).
76.

§ 2241(c)(1)

(2006)); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008).

77. See Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account:
Aftermath ofBoumediene v. Bush, _, WAYNE LAW REVIEW _ (2011).
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and to contest the government's evidence, and access to counsel." These
procedural safeguards, however, have been limited in important respects.
The government has been permitted to rely extensively, often exclusively,
on hearsay; denied detainees access to information; and been held only to a
preponderance of the evidence standard, a lower standard than in other noncriminal matters where individuals are deprived of their liberty. Several
decisions by the D.C. Circuit, moreover, have taken a particularly narrow
view of detainees' habeas rights, requiring deference to the government's
evidence and advocating an even lower standard of proof than
preponderance.8 0 Post-Boumediene habeas rulings, moreover, have upheld
the president's authority to detain noncitizens at Guantdnamo indefinitely in
military custody, without charge or trial.8 1 Notably, courts have refused to
confine the president's military detention authority to the battlefield,82
expanding the authority recognized in Hamdi to justify a defacto system of
preventive detention at Guantinamo that allows for detention based on an
individual's alleged membership in or association with al Qaeda or
associated groups. 8 3 The past decade of "enemy combatant" jurisprudence
at Guantinamo thus resembles the past century of immigration law in its
basic outlines: preserving limited access to the courts and due process

78.
Id. (describingpost-Boumediene habeas process); Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C Circuit
After Boumediene, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 4 (2011) (same); Baher Azmy, Executive Detention,
Boumediene and the New Common Law ofHabeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 460-61 (2010) (same).
79. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (requiring clear and convincing
evidence to support civil commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence to support deportation).
80. See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See also Esmail v.
Obama, No. 10-5282, 2011 WL 1327701, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 8, 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring)
(noting that a judge will not and should not order the release of a GuantAnamo detainee if he or she
believes it "somewhat likely that the petitioner is an al Qaeda adherent or an active supporter")
(emphasis added).
81.
See, e.g., Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (evidence of association
with other al Qaeda members can itself be probative of al Qaeda membership); Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at
1108 (concluding that circumstantial evidence, such as having stayed at an al Qaeda guesthouse, is
"powerful," if not "overwhelming" evidence that an individual is "part of' al Qaeda and thus detainable
under the AUMF).
82. See, e.g., Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding
district court grant of habeas corpus to a petitioner seized in Mauritania and who concededly was never
on a battlefield or took part in hostilities against U.S. or allied forces during the U.S. armed conflict
against al Qaeda).
83.
See Kristine A. Huskey, Guantanamo and Beyond: Reflections on the Past,Present, and
Future of Preventive Detention, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 183, 201-02 (2011) (discussing failure of D.C. Circuit
to constrain the boundaries of the battlefield, contributing to the establishment of a preventive detention
regime).
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protections while sustaining the government's broad power over the liberty
of noncitizens.84
D. Security as Proxyfor OtherAims
Security has long been invoked as a rationale for immigration
restrictions. Since the mid-1990s, terrorism and migration have been
increasingly conflated." President Clinton, for example, exploited the
"terrorization of America" by foreigners to justify increased border
control. 86 Although prompted by the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings-a
terrorist attack committed by American citizens-AEDPA became a
vehicle for the passage of various anti-immigrant measures, including
provisions facilitating the expedited removal of noncitizens.87 Following
the 9/11 attacks, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, which
contained several provisions targeting noncitizens, including the broadening
of the grounds for removal based on a person's support for terrorist activity
and permitting the indefinite detention of suspected alien terrorists who
could not be removed from the country. 8 The REAL ID Act continued this
trend, including by enlarging the definition of "terrorist organization" to
sweep in more criminal conduct unrelated to terrorism. 9
These measures appear to have little actual bearing on national
security. Only a tiny fraction of removals each year are based on security
grounds-and this number has decreased since 9/11.90 Despite how much
security-based rhetoric drives immigration policy, removal remains a tool
used principally for noncitizens who have committed immigration

84. See generally Faiza W. Sayed, Challenging Detention, Why Immigrant Detainees Receive
Less Process Than "Enemy Combatants" and Why They Deserve More, Ill COLUM. L. REv. 1833
(2011) (comparing respective histories and current status of immigrant detainees and alleged "enemy
combatant" detainees).
85.
See Dan Eggen, Tough Anti-Terror Campaign Pledged; Ashcroft Tells Mayors He Will
Use New Law to Fullest Extent, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al ("Let the terrorists among us be
warned ... [i]f you overstay your visas even by one day, we will arrest you.").
86.

See President William Jefferson Clinton, Press Conference, July 27, 1993.

87.

See Chacon, supranote 8, at 1852.

88. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 376, 411, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (expanding
definition of "material support for terrorism" to include, for example, actions that involve the use of any
"dangerous device" for any purpose other than "mere personal monetary gain"); id. §412 (authorizing
the indefinite detention of suspected alien terrorists under specified circumstances).
89. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13,
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1103).
90.

See Chacon, supranote 8, at 1860.

§

103, 119 Stat. 302, 308 (codified as
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violations or removable criminal offenses.91 The past two decades of
immigration law thus highlights the degree to which national security
provides as a proxy for measures that restrict the rights of noncitizens
without serving the ends of security. 92
The post-9/11 treatment of "enemy combatants" illustrates a similar
disconnect. After 9/11, for example, the United States brought hundreds of
prisoners to Guantinamo for interrogation and continued detention. Early
on, military and intelligence officials recognized that many of the prisoners
at Guantinamo neither presented a threat to the United States nor had
valuable information. 9 4 "[I]n many cases, we had simply gotten the slowest
guys on the battlefield. We literally found the guys who had been shot in
the butt," commented one Pentagon official responsible for helping
establish the first war crimes tribunals at the naval base.96
Bush administration officials justified the detentions by labeling the
prisoners the "worst of the worst" and claiming that Guantinamo was vital
to America's security. 97 These explanations, however, often masked other
reasons for the detentions, including hostility to prosecuting prisoners in
federal court, difficulties in returning prisoners to their home countries or
repatriating them to third countries, and a desire to appear tough on
terrorism.9 Meanwhile, Guantinamo came under withering criticism both
at home and abroad.99
Eventually, a political consensus emerged around closing
Guantinamo. During the 2008 presidential campaign, candidates from both
91.

Id. at 1861.

92.
See Kevin R. Johnson, It's the Economy, Stupid The Hiacking of the Debate Over
Immigration Reform By Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (Or the War on Drugs, War on Terror,
Narcoterrorists,Etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583, 592-600 (arguing that the conflation of immigration law
and national security is more reflective of political ends than the centrality of immigration in the socalled "war on terror").
93.

More than 775 prisoners in total were brought to Guantinamo; 171 still remain.

94. See HAFETZ, supra note 12, at 151 ("even based on the government's own untested
allegations, most prisoners were not dangerous terrorists, and many were wholly innocent").
95.

JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 70 (2006)

(quoting Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Berg).
96.

Id.

97.

HAFETZ, supra, note 12, at 134.

98. The cases of the seventeen Uighur detainees, those members of the persecuted Muslim
minority from China long held at Guantinamo, perhaps best illustrate these difficulties and desires. See
id. at 248-50.
99. See id. at 155 (citing criticisms); Johan Steyn, Guantinamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole,
Speech at the 27th FA Mann Lecture (Brit. Inst. of Int'l & Comp. Law, Nov. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.oslaw.com/itow/source-files/Steyn%20speech.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
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major parties said GuantAnamo should be closed.'00 (President Bush had
previously expressed a desire to close the prison if possible).' 0 As
explained below, the Obama administration's subsequent failure to close
GuantAnamo highlights the gap between the rhetoric and reality of security.
It also provides a window into how themes from immigration law continue
to resurface in the public and legal debate over the "war on terrorism."
II. THE FAILURE TO CLOSE GUANTANAMO

Following his inauguration, President Obama issued a directive
ordering the closure of the GuantAnamo Bay detention facility within one
year.'02 In explaining his decision, Obama underscored the importance of
upholding constitutional principles and human rights in the fight against
terrorism.103 Moreover, Obama observed, any benefits Guantinamo
provided were outweighed by the harms it caused, both to America's
security and values.'04 "[T]he existence of GuantAnamo likely created more
terrorists around the world than it ever detained," he remarked.0 s
More than two years into his administration, Obama's plan to close
Guantinamo is in shambles. Since taking office, only sixty-eight prisoners
have been transferred from GuantAnamo, sixty-seven to their home country
or a third country, and one (Ahmed Ghailani) to face criminal prosecution
in the United States, 171 prisoners still remain at the base.' 06 More
importantly, legislation now prevents the president from transferring
100. Carol Rosenberg, What to Do About Guantdnamo Vexes Both Obama, McCain, MIAMI
HERALD (July 13, 2008), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/07/13/v-print/44087/what-to-do-aboutguantanamo-vexes.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
101. Bush: I Would Like to Close Guantdnamo, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 8, 2006),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,194634,00.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
102.

Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).

103. See Scott Shane, Obama Orders Secret Prisons and Detention Camps Closed,N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/us/politics/23GITMOCND.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2012) (reporting Obama's statement during the order's signing that "'our ideals give us
the strength and moral high ground' to combat terrorism").
104. Barack Obama, Remarks By the President on National Security (May 21, 2009), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-2109 (last visited Mar. 30, 2012) ("Instead of building a durable framework for the struggle against al
Qaeda that drew upon our deeply held values and traditions, our govemment was defending positions
that undermined the rule of law . . . [r]ather than keeping us safer, the prison at Guantanamo has
weakened American national security").
105. See Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President On National Security
(May 21, 2009).
106. See The Guantdnamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012), available at
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo?ref-guantanamobaynavalbasecuba (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
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Guantinamo detainees to the United States and restricts his ability to
transfer them to third countries.' 7 In light of these developments, Defense
Secretary Gates has acknowledged that the prospects for closing
Guantinamo are "very, very low.", 08 To put it more bluntly, the United
States is, as a practical matter, much further from closing the detention
center now than when Obama took office.
Several factors help explain the unraveling of Obama's plan to close
Guantinamo: Obama's own ambivalence about the broader policies
underlying Guantinamo, including the indefinite detention of terrorism
suspects and use of military commissions; a political backlash that has
altered the public perception of GuantAinamo and paved the way for
legislation preventing the transfer of GuantAinamo detainees to the United
States; and court decisions narrowly interpreting the judiciary's role in
reviewing the legality of and remedying the detentions. As described
below, concepts from immigration law help explain each factor.
A. Guantdnamo and the DiferentialTreatment ofNoncitizens
Even as Obama vowed to close GuantAinamo, he endorsed the two key
features underlying the prison: the indefinite detention of terrorism
suspects without charge and the prosecution of terrorism suspects in
military commissions.109 In his May 2009 National Archives speech,
Obama reiterated the importance of closing GuantAinamo and expressed his
administration's preference for trying Guantinamo detainees in federal
court where possible.1 o But Obama also defended the indefinite detention
and military prosecution of GuantAinamo detainees under the Constitution,
federal statute, and the law of war.'" Obama, in other words, did not plan
to end the Guantinamo system so much as improve it: closing the
detention facility but reforming, rather than eradicating, the legal
architecture that supported it. The administration thus provided a more

107. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong.
1026-28 (2011).

§§

108. Charley Keyes, Gates: Prospects for closing Guantinamo "very, very low", CNN.CoM
(Feb. 17, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-17/politics/senate.gates.gitmoI terrorists-detentioncenter-military-commissions?_s=PM:POLITICS (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
109. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security at the
National Archives, Washington, D.C. (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
thepress-office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
110. Id. ("First, whenever feasible, we will try those who have violated American criminal laws
in federal courts - courts provided for by the United States Constitution").
111. Id. ("Military commissions are an appropriate venue for trying detainees for violations of
the laws of war").
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nuanced statement of the president's military detention powers under the
Authortization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), as informed by the law
of war;' 1 2 conducted an initial review of all detainee cases 13 and created a
more permanent mechanism for further executive-branch review;'14 and
helped secured the passage of new legislation that improved military
commissions."'
Meanwhile, the administration continued to defend
aggressively many GuantAnamo detentions in the federal court habeas
corpus litigation.
The president's retention of indefinite detention and military
commissions, notwithstanding these reforms, has undermined his plan to
close the prison. It maintained the legal structure that made Guantinamo
feasible by perpetuating an alternative to the federal criminal prosecution of
terrorism suspects."'6 It also left an option to be exercised as political
opposition to closing GuantAnamo mounted."' Had the president not
maintained the possibility of indefinite detention or military commissions, it
would have been more difficult, for example, for the administration to
reverse Attorney General Eric Holder's original decision to prosecute
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other 9/11 co-conspirators in federal
court." 8 The administration may initially have kept the indefinite
112. See Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Scope of the Government's Detention
Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantinamo Bay, In re GuantAnamo Bay Detainee Litigation,
Misc. No. 08-442, filed Mar. 13, 2009 (D.D.C.) (changing the status of detainees from "enemy
combatants" to "unprivileged enemy belligerents" and requiring that a prisoner's support for al Qaeda,
the Taliban, or associated forces, be "substantial" to justify his continued detention).
113.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE (Jan.

22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf (last visited Mar.
30, 2012).
114. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13277 (Mar. 7, 2011) (creating new "Periodic
Review Boards" to review the cases of those prisoners approved for continued detention). See also
Charlie Savage, Detainee Review Proposal Is Preparedfor Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2010),
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/us/22gitmo.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
115. MCA of 2009, supra note 45 (amending Military Commissions Act of 2006). The MCA
of 2009, for example, provided greater restrictions on the use of hearsay and evidence obtained by
coercion. See HAFETZ, supranote 12, at 241-42 (discussing the MCA of 2009).
116. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military
Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 295, 296 (2010) ("Nine years, one Supreme court
decision, two statutes, and a veritable mountain of popular and academic discourse later, one might
reasonable conclude that we've made distressingly little progress in resolving the myriad constitutional
questions that such tribunals raise").
117. Charlie Savage, Closing Guantdnamo Fades as a Priority,N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 26, 2010, at
Al3.
118. Charlie Savage, In Reversal, Military Trialsfor 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at
Al.
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detention/military commission option alive because it believed some cases
would be too difficult to prosecute due to evidentiary or other legal
problems. But it also exercised that option when some cases became too
complicated to prosecute in domestic courts as a result of political pressure,
even if there were no legal hurdles to obtaining a conviction.
Maintaining the Guantdnamo paradigm has also made closure seem
symbolic. What difference, commentators on both the Left and Right have
asked, does it matter if prisoners continue to be held at Guantinamo rather
than on U.S. soil if they are going to be subject to the same military, law-ofwar based legal framework? Detached from any major shift in policy,
closing Guantinamo lost its sense of urgency, even necessity.
Obama's retention of indefinite detention and military commissions
illustrates a theme endemic to immigration law: how the development of
less rights-protective adjudicatory mechanisms for noncitizens can become
normalized. More than a century of immigration law has entrenched the
principle that noncitizens may be removed from the country without the
same constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial, despite the
potentially draconian nature of the liberty deprivation.' 19 It has also helped
perpetuate the view that noncitizens are less deserving of legal protections
as citizens. Guantdnamo has similarly witnessed the development of
alternative adjudicatory structures for noncitizens that lack important
constitutional protections, notwithstanding the extraordinary consequences
for the individuals affected.
As these structures have become
institutionalized at Guantinamo, they have embedded the differential
treatment of noncitizens, which, unlike American citizens, need not receive
a trial when suspected of terrorist activity.120 They have also helped
prevent the prison's closure by legitimizing another option to criminal
prosecution for dealing with noncitizens detained by the United States in
the course of counter-terrorism operations.' 2 1
B. The Failureto Resettle Detaineesin the United States
Any feasible plan to close Guantinamo required that the United States
government resettle at least some detainees in the United States, partly to
obtain the necessary diplomatic buy-in from other countries, especially in
Europe, on whom the United States was relying to shoulder a large part of

119. See Andrea Lovell, The Proper Scope of Habeas Corpus Review in Civil Removal
Proceedings,73 WASH. L. REV. 459,466-67 (1998).
120.

HAFETZ, supra note 12, at 211-13.

121. Id. at 241-42 (discussing the perpetuation of the flawed military commission regime under
the Obama administration).
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the resettlement burden.122 The most obvious candidates for resettlement in
the United States were the Uighurs, members of a Turkic Muslim minority
from northwestern China.123 The U.S. government had long ago conceded
it had no basis to detain the Uighurs as "enemy combatants." 24 Although
the Uighurs could not be safely returned to China, where they faced
imprisonment and other persecution, substantial efforts had been made to
resettle them in the United States and integrate them into an existing Uighur

community there.125
The Obama administration originally planned to bring several Uighurs
to the United States as part of its effort to close Guantinamo.1 26 But the
administration killed the plan at the first sign of protest.127 It then failed to
quell the political backlash, leading to a series of congressional
appropriations measures barring the release of any Guantinamo detainee
into the United States.128 The lack of resistance emboldened Congress,
which subsequently enacted legislation preventing the president from
transferring Guantinamo detainees to the United States for any purpose,

122. See Justin Blum, Some Chinese Guantdnamo Detainees Likely to Be Released in U.S.,
3,
2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
Bloomberg
(June
apMw9EAc4PtU (last visited Mar. 10, 2012) (quoting former State Department legal advisor John
Bellinger III that it would be "impossible to get European counties to agree to resettle any detainees
unless [the United States] take[s] some"). See also ProposedBudget Estimatesfor the Fiscal 2009 War
Supplemental: Hearing Before the S. AppropriationsComm., 11Ith Cong. (2009) (statement of Robert
M. Gates) (noting difficulty State Department will face resettling detainees if the United States does not
take any detainees itself).
123. See HAFETZ, supranote 12, at 248-50 for a discussion of the Uighur cases.
124. Qassim v. Bush, 382 F. Supp. 2d 126, 127-28 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting the CSRT's finding
that Uighur detainees could not continue to be held as "enemy combatants").
125. See William Glaberson, 6 Detainees Freed as Questions Linger, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 11,
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/world/12gitmo.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2012) (noting the Obama administration's plan to resettle some of the Uighurs in the United States).
126. Id.
127. Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle Over Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, NEW
YORKER (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/02/15/100215fa factmayer (last
visited Mar. 10, 2012).
128. See 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859 (enacted
June 24, 2009); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub .L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat.
2142 (2010); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat.
2190 (enacted October 28, 2009); Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-88, 123 Stat. 2904 (2010); Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 (2010); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. Ill118, 123 Stat. 3409 (2010). See also ANNA C. HENNING, GuANTANAMO DETENTION CENTER:
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY IN THE 11ITH CONGRESS 2, 3-4 (Cong. Res. Serv., R 40754,2010).
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including for continued detention or criminal prosecution.' 29 In the face of
this legislation, plans to bring some Guantinamo detainees to a facility in
the United States for further law-of-war based confinement under the
AUMF's 0 fizzled, while efforts to prosecute other Guantinamo detainees in
Article III courts were abandoned in favor of military commission
prosecutions at Guantinamo.'
The backlash to resettling the Uighurs or other Guantinamo detainees
in the United States reflects the association between immigrants and
terrorism that long pre-dates 9/11. The Uighurs, as the government
conceded, presented no national security threat to the United States.132
Moreover, equitable concerns weighed strongly in their favor: the Uighurs
did not come to the United States seeking admission but were instead
forcibly brought to Guantinamo and imprisoned there; they were going to
be released in the United States only because they could not be safely
repatriated to their home country.133 The Uighurs nevertheless became the
focal point for broader sentiments associating migrants with terrorism.
They were portrayed as dangerous foreigners whose presence on American
soil would jeopardize the country's safety. Indeed, the association between
migrants and terrorism has proven so powerful that it has helped drive
legislation barring the transfer of any Guantinamo detainee to the United
States, even for continued detention. One impulse behind this legislation is
the fear that a court, exercising its constitutionally mandated habeas
jurisdiction under Boumediene, might more easily order the release of a
prisoner who was unlawfully detained in a U.S. facility (after being
transferred from Guantinamo) than if the prisoner were still being held at
Guantinamo.1 34 Closing Guantinamo was thus portrayed as undermining
the United States' ability to exclude foreign nationals in the name of
national security by opening the door to their entering the United States-a
fear that previously motivated immigration legislation aimed at the
exclusion and deportation of noncitizens to protect against terrorism.

129. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.R. 6523,
I 11th Cong. § 1031 (2010).
130.

HAFETZ, supranote 12, at 250.

131. See Richard A. Serrano, Obama to Resume Military Trials for Guantdnamo Detainees,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/08/nation/la-na-obamaguantanamo-20110308 (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
132.

Qassim, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 127-28.

133.

See Glaberson, supranote 125.

134.

HAFETZ, supra note 12, at 250.
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C. The PlenaryPower Doctrineand GuantanamoHabeasLitigation
Judicial decisions addressing a court's power to order the release of
detainees from Guantinamo into the United States similarly reflects the
influence of doctrines and concepts rooted in immigration law. In Kiyemba
v. Obama, the district judge ordered the release of seventeen Uighur
detainees from Guantinamo into the United States, under terms set by the
court, after determining their continued detention was illegal.' 35 The
exercise of its habeasjurisdiction, the district court reasoned, must include
the power to remedy unlawful imprisonment by crafting an appropriate
release order.13 6 The D.C. Circuit reversed. In a divided ruling, the appeals
panel held in Kiyemba v. Obama that judges could not order a Guantinamo
detainee's release into the United States, even if there was no alternative
remedy and the detainee would remain confined at Guantinamo as a
result."'
The D.C. Circuit relied on immigration cases for the proposition that
the political branches have plenary power to exclude individuals from the
United States.' 38 Under Kiyemba, the political branches' immigrationbased power to exclude trumps a district court's remedial power to grant
relief in a Suspension Clause-based habeas corpus challenge.'" 9 The D.C.
Circuit analogized the Uighurs' plight to that of the petitioner in
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, who remained confined at Ellis
Island following his exclusion on national security grounds when no other
country was willing to accept him.140 Like Mezei, the appeals court
reasoned, Guantinamo detainees have no right to enter the United States,
temporarily or otherwise, absent express legislative authorization, even if
their exclusion results in their indefinite, potentially permanent
imprisonment. 141 As construed by the D.C. Circuit in Kiyemba, the federal
government's immigration power sharply curtails, if not potentially negates,

135. In re Guantdnamo Bay DetaineeLitigation, 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34 (D.D.C. 2008).
136. Id. at 42-43.
137. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
138. Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1025-26 (citing, inter alia, The Chinese Exclusion Case; Chae Chan
Pingv. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
139. HAFETZ, supra note 12, at 249 ("The appeals court relied principally on the federal
government's power to control immigration, even though the Uighurs were not seeking admission to the
United States or legal status under U.S. immigration law, but were asking only for temporary release
from imprisonment until another country could be found for them.").
140. Shaughnessy v. U.S., 345 U.S. 206,207 (1953).
141. Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1028-29.
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the judicial role recognized in Boumediene.142 A judge may be authorized
under the Constitution's Suspension Clause to exercise habeas review and
invalidate a petitioner's confinement, but it cannot override the prerogatives
of the political branches by ordering the petitioner into the United States as
a form of relief.'4 3 The concurring opinion in Kiyemba resisted this
conflation of national security and immigration, explaining that a federal
habeas judge had the remedial power to order the prisoners into the United
States, but that the lower court should first have ascertained whether the
government had an alternate basis for detaining the petitioners under
immigration law before ordering their release.144
The Supreme Court has, to be sure, exhibited some skepticism of the
D.C. Circuit's approach. The Court initially granted certiorari in Kiyemba,
but declined to hear the case on the merits after the government presented
new facts showing that it had found other countries where the petitioners
could be relocated.145 On remand, the D.C. Circuit held that these new facts
did not alter its prior ruling, concluding again that the judiciary had no
power to order the release of a Guantinamo detainee into the United States
under any circumstances, absent express legislative authorization.146 This
time, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 4 A separate statement signed
by four Justices concurring in the denial emphasized the continued
possibility of release in a third country.'48 Thus, while the Court may not
share the D.C. Circuit's view that a judge cannot order the release of a
Guantinamo detainee into the United States under any circumstances, given
the political branches' immigration power, it likely views a judge's
remedial power as more limited where there is some other country to which
the detainee can be transferred and continued detention at Guantdnamo is
142. See Samuel Chow, The Kiyemba Paradox: Creating a JudicialFramework to Eradicate
Indefinite, Unlawful Executive Detentions, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 775, 797-98 (2011)
(discussing the Court's departure in Kiyemba from role of the judiciary recognized in Boumediene).
143. Id. (noting the Court's denial of its own ability to order functional release).
144. Id. at 1032 (Rogers, J., concurring).
145. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235 (2010) (per curium) (vacating the D.C.
Circuit's decision and remanding to the appeals court to reconsider its prior ruling in light of these new
facts).
146. Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
147. Kiyemba v.Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631, 1631 (2011).
148. Id. (statement of Breyer, J., joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, J.J., respecting
the denial of the petition for certiorari) (noting that the petitioners had previously received offers of
resettlement (at least one of which could be renewed); that there was no evidence that the petitioners'
acceptance of these resettlement offers would have put them at risk of torture or other mistreatment; and
that the government continued to seek other resettlement options). Justice Kagan recused herself due to
her prior involvement in the case as Solicitor General.
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not the only alternative. In any event, the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Kiyemba remains the law, and judges have no authority to order the release
of a Guantdinamo detainee into the United States even if there is no other
remedy.14 9
III. CONCLUSION
Nearly a decade after 9/11, national security policies like the indefinite
detention and military prosecution of terrorism suspects no longer seem
aberrational, but have become permanent features of the legal landscape.
Part of a "new normal," they have been adopted by two administrations,
endorsed by Congress, and largely sanctioned by the courts. In its broad
features, the United States' treatment of terrorism suspects shares important
similarities its treatment of immigrants, and rests on the acceptance of an
alternative adjudicatory framework for adjudicating the rights of
noncitizens.
Rather than waning over time, practices associated with the "war on
terror" are threatening to expand in new, even radical ways. Recent
legislation not only affirms in express terms the presidents' authority to
detain individuals indefinitely in connection with the armed conflict against
al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, which the AUMF did only by
implication. 50 It also mandates the military detention of certain noncitizen
terrorism suspects, subject to a waiver by the President that military is not
in the interests of national security.''
The legislation categorically
excludes citizens from mandatory military detention.152 The legislation
thus illustrates how policies underlying Guantanamo are becoming
institutionalized. It also suggests how counter-terrorism policies that
expand the government's detention authority, restrict the rights of
noncitizens, and create a two-tiered justice system increasingly resembles
the United States' longstanding approach to immigrants generally.

149. Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1026-29.
150. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong.
(2011) (enacted) ("2012 NDAA") (authorizing the president to detain, inter alia,individuals who
were "part of' or who provided "substantial support" to al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners).

§ 1021

151. Id. § 1022 (establishing a requirement of military detention for certain non-citizen al
Qaeda terrorism suspects, but allowing the President to waive this requirement by certifying that such
waiver is in the national security interests of the United States).
152. Id. § 1022(b)(1).

